This paper studies optimal taxation in an overlapping generations economy. We characterize the optimal path of scal policy, both in the long run and in the transition to the steady state. The implications of this study are in sharp contrast with the prescription o ered by in nitely-lived agent models. First, the government's desire to tax initial holdings of capital at con scatory rates is endogenously curtailed by i n tergenerational redistributional considerations. Second, because of life-cycle elements, capital income taxes are in general di erent from zero even in the steady state. The tax rate on capital income should only be zero if it is optimal to tax consumption goods uniformly over the lifetime of individuals. The conditions for uniform taxation of consumption depend, in turn, on preferences, the age-pro le of labor productivity, and the set of taxes available to the government. JEL E62, H21
Introduction
A classic problem in public nance concerns the optimal manner in which to nance a given stream of government purchases in the absence of lump-sum taxation. In the context of a standard neoclassical growth model with in nitely-lived individuals or dynasties, Chamley 1986 and Judd 1985 have demonstrated that an optimal income-tax policy entails taxing capital at con scatory rates in the short-run and setting capital income taxes equal to zero in the long-run. The optimality of this initial levy of capital relies heavily on the in nitely-lived agent abstraction, in which altruistic individuals are more than compensated by the elimination of distortionary taxation in the future.
The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the question of optimal taxation when there are overlapping generations of individuals who attach zero weight to the well-being of future generations. In this environment, the government faces a trade-o between equity and e ciency. The individuals on whom the burden of a front-loading policy fall are no longer the same individuals who in the long-run bene t from the elimination of distortionary taxation. The government's desire to resort to con scatory taxation of initial holdings of capital is thus endogenously curtailed by i n tergenerational redistributional considerations. In contrast to the in nitely-lived agent model, there is no need in this framework to impose exogenous bounds on feasible capital income taxes to circumvent the arguably trivial solution outlined above Chamley 1986 , Jones et al. 1993 , Chari et al. 1994 and implicitly Lucas 1990 .
In order to study optimal taxation in this environment, we formulate a Ramsey problem in which social welfare is de ned as the discounted sum of successive generations' lifetime utility as in Samuelson 1968 and Sandmo 1980 . This formulation of the government's objective respects the valuations placed by individuals on consumption at di erent dates. Consequently, an allocation solving the Ramsey problem is constrained Pareto e cient, in the sense that it cannot bePareto dominated by any other allocation that is a competitive equilibrium for some scal policy.
We show that optimal taxation in overlapping generations economies generally features taxes on capital and labor income that are di erent from zero during the transition as well as in the steady state. We study Ramsey taxation for two tax systems: one where tax rates are allowed to depend on the age of the individual supplying the factors of production, the other with age-independent taxes. We show that the set of allocations that the government can implement with age-independent taxes is a subset of the set of implementable allocations under an age-dependent tax system. Nevertheless, both tax systems share many properties. First, consumption taxes are redundant and, therefore, can be ruled out without loss of generality. Second, taxes on both capital and labor income are in general di erent from zero. Third, the steady state capital-labor ratio has the modi ed golden rule property. This property implies, as was originally shown by Samuelson 1968 , that the capital labor-ratio coincides with that of a rst best allocation, that is, one where the government has access to lump-sum taxes. Fourth, if the Ramsey equilibrium allocation converges to a steady state, then the steady state is independent of the transition path. We emphasize that this property does not hold in in nitely-lived agent models. In particular, the exogenous bounds constraining taxes during the transition determine the nal steady state.
We nd the conditions for zero taxation of capital income in overlapping generations economies to be closely related to the uniform commodity taxation results in the public nance literature see Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980 . For instance, the tax rate on capital income should only be zero if it is optimal to tax the consumption of goods uniformly over the lifetime of individuals. The conditions for uniform taxation of consumption depend, in turn, on preferences, the age-pro le of labor productivity, and the set of tax instruments available to the government. We also nd conditions under which the relative tax rates on labor income at di erent ages are inversely related to the relative income elasticities of labor supplied at those ages. When taxes are not allowed to depend on age, the government can reduce the total deadweight loss of distortionary taxation by taxing capital income. The government can thus nd optimal to tax capital income even if optimal capital income taxes are zero in an age-dependent tax system. In other words, the conditions for zero taxation of capital income are much more stringent under an age-independent tax system.
Atkinson and Sandmo 1980 provide one of the rst studies of optimal taxation in overlapping generations economies. They show that a rst-best steady state allocation can beachieved if the government can use lump-sum taxes. They also show, however, that in the absence of government debt, consumption taxes, and lump-sum taxes, the government does not have enough instruments to achieve the modi ed golden rule capital-labor ratio. Park 1989 shows that in a model with intra-generational heterogeneity the government might use distortionary taxation to redistribute income across individuals with di erent innate abilities. In our paper we abstract from intra-generational redistributional issues. Our model builds on the framework developed by Auerbach and Kotliko 1987 to study scal policies. Escolano 1991 computes numerically optimal Ramsey taxes in this framework. Unlike previous studies of optimal taxation in overlapping generations models, we formulate the Ramsey problem using the primal approach Stiglitz 1980, Lucas and Stokey 1983 . Under this approach, rather than choosing a sequence of tax rates, the government directly chooses a feasible resource allocation subject to a series of constraints guaranteeing that the allocation can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium for some scal policy. This formulation of the Ramsey problem leads to an explicit characterization of the Ramsey policy. Our study also sheds some light o n h o w life-cycle elements a ect the optimal scal policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the economic environment. In section 3 we formulate the Ramsey problem and characterize optimal scal policies. Section 4 discusses age-independent taxes. In section 5 we present some numerical examples. Two striking properties emanate from the Ramsey equilibrium allocations generated in these examples. First, the allocations under age-dependent and age-independent taxes are very similar. Second, they are extremely sensitive t o c hanges in the intergenerational discount factor.
The Economy
Consider an economy in which there are an in nite number of time periods, t, indexed by positive integers. The economy is populated by overlapping generations of identical individuals. Individuals live J + 1 periods, from age 0 to age J. At each time period a new generation is born. The population is assumed to grow at constant rate n per period. Consequently, the share of age-j individuals in the population, j , is time invariant and satis es j = j,1 =1 + n, for j = 1 ; : : : ; J , where P J j=0 j = 1 : W e subsequently use the shares j to express aggregate variables in percapita terms. Each generation is indexed by its date of birth. At date t = 0 the generations alive are ,J; ,J + 1 ; : : : ; 0. Individuals derive utility from consumption goods and leisure. The objective of an individual born in period t , J is given by J X j=j 0 t j,j 0 t U c t;j ; 1 , l t;j ; 1 where c t;j and l t;j respectively denote consumption and time devoted to work in period t + j b y an age-j individual born in period t. The age of individuals alive at date zero is denoted j 0 t. For generations t 0, j 0 t = 0 , so that in general j 0 t maxf,t; 0g. We assume 0 and that the utility function U; is increasing in both arguments, strictly concave, and satis es standard Inada conditions. Individuals are endowed with one unit of time in each period of their life. We assume that an age-j individual can transform one unit of time into z j e ciency units of labor for j = 0 ; : : : ; J . The date-t aggregate labor input, expressed in e ciency units, is given by l t = J X j=0 j z j l t,j;j :
At each date there is a unique produced good that can be used for private consumption, government consumption, or as capital. The technology to produce goods is represented by a neoclassical production function with constant returns to scale: y t = fk t ; l t ; 2 where y t ; k t and l t denote the levels of aggregate output, capital, and e ective labor, respectively. Feasibility requires that total consumption plus investment be less than or equal to aggregate output c t + 1 + n k t +1 , 1 , k t + g t y t ; 3 where 0 1 is the depreciation rate of capital, c t denotes aggregate private consumption at date t, g t stands for date-t government consumption, and all aggregate variables are expressed in per capita terms.
To nance its exogenous stream of expenditures, we assume that the government has access to a set of scal policy instruments and a commitment technology to implement its scal policy. The set of instruments consists of proportional taxes on consumption, labor and capital income, as well as government debt. At each date, the tax rates on factor services are allowed to depend on the age of the individual supplying the services. The date-t tax rates on capital and labor services supplied by an age-j individual born in period t , j are denoted by a t,j;j and w t,j;j , respectively. Similarly, consumption taxes are allowed to depend on the age of the consumer, and we use c t,j;j to represent the date-t tax rate on consumption of an age-j individual. Equivalently, the government chooses the after-tax prices of consumption goods, q t,j;j , labor services, w t,j;j , and capital services, r t,j;j , with these prices depending on the age of the consumer or the supplier of the factor service. In addition, the government can issue debt in order to match a n y i m balance between expenditures and revenues in any given period. It is assumed that the government taxes the return on capital and debt at the same rate, making debt and capital perfect substitutes. We denote total asset holdings of an age-j individual at date t by a t,j;j . The government budget constraint at date t 0 is given by 1 +r t b t + g t = 1 + n b t +1 + J X j=0 q t,j;j , 1 j c t,j;j + J X j=0 r t ,r t , j;j j a t,j;j + J X j=0 w t , w t , j;j j z j l t,j;j ; 4 where q t;j 1+ c t;j , w t;j 1, w t;j w t + j , and r t;j 1, a t;j r t + j .Note that the producer price of consumption goods has been normalized at one. Before-tax prices for capital and labor are given byr t = f k k t ; l t , andŵ t = f l k t ; l t .
An individual born at period t , J solves the following problem: max J X j=j 0 t j,j 0 t U c t;j ; 1 , l t;j ; 5 q t;j c t;j + a t;j+1 = w t;j z j l t;j + 1 + r t;j a t;j ; j = j 0 t; : : : ; J ; where 0 1 is the intergenerational discount factor. This formulation of the government's objective respects the valuations placed by individuals on consumption at di erent dates. Consequently, an allocation solving the Ramsey problem is constrained Pareto e cient, in the sense that it cannot be Pareto dominated by any other allocation that is a competitive equilibrium for some scal policy. The standard trade-o between equity and e ciency becomes transparent with the explicit relative valuation of all generations a ected by scal policy. This is in sharp contrast with optimal taxation problems in in nitely-lived agent models. As emphasized by Escolano 1991, when interpreted as a guide for scal policy, in nitely-lived agent models tend to put as much burden on currently alive individuals as possible. In particular, the government can perfectly imitate a lump-sum tax by taxing heavily initial holdings of nancial assets. Judd 1985 , Chamley 1986 , Chari et al. 1994 , Jones et al. 1993 , and other authors in this literature introduce upper bounds on feasible capital income taxes to avoid initial con scatory taxes. The bounds assumed determine the magnitude of the welfare gains achieved by switching to the taxes prescribed by the optimal Ramsey problem. Indeed, with su ciently high bounds a Pareto optimal equilibrium can be achieved. In overlapping generations economies, however, the explicit valuation of di erent generations' felicity e ectively limits the government's desire to resort to a front-loading policy and, consequently, there is no need to impose exogenous bounds on capital income taxes.
Optimal Fiscal Policy
In this section we show that, in general in a sense that will be speci ed below, the solution to the Ramsey problem features non-zero taxes on capital and labor income. In particular, and contrary to in nitely-lived agent models, if the Ramsey allocation converges to a steady state solution, optimal capital income taxes will in general bedi erent from zero even in that steady state. These results are obtained by identifying conditions under which optimal capital or labor income taxes are zero. We then nd parameter restrictions for two classes of utility functions that satisfy the condition for the optimality of zero capital income taxation. We begin the analysis by formulating the Ramsey problem.
The Ramsey Problem
The Ramsey problem consists of choosing a set of taxes so that the allocation that arises when prices and quantities are determined in competitive markets maximizes a given welfare function. The set of allocations that the government can implement thus consists of the allocations chosen by individuals for any arbitrary scal policy. The allocations belonging to this set are formally de ned below.
De nition 1 Implementable Allocation Let w t,j;jq t,j;j q t,j;j j z j l t,j;j :
Multiplying both sides of the previous expression by q t,j;j =q t,j;j we obtain the government budget constraints under the initial scal policy. Since this constraint holds at all dates by assumption under the initial scal policy, we conclude that the government budget constraints also hold under the alternative scal policy, and condition D1c is also satis ed.
It is interesting to consider this redundancy Proposition in light of the ndings in Summers 1981. This author shows that since the timing of tax collections over the lifetime of individuals is very di erent under labor income or consumption taxation, the two sources of taxation give rise to very di erent age-savings patterns. This leads to Summers' nding that wage taxation signi cantly reduces the economy's capital intensity relative to consumption taxation. Proposition 1 shows that this result does not hold in our economy. The reason is that in our economy the government is allowed to borrow and lend. As a result, any di erence in aggregate savings between tax regimes is absorbed by government debt and the capital stock is una ected by the choice between consumption and wage taxation.
Without any loss of generality, we set c t;j equal to zero for all t and j throughout the rest of the paper.
Let p t;j denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint 6 faced by an age-j individual born in period t. The necessary and su cient conditions for a solution to the consumers' problem are given by 6 and j,j 0 t U c t;j , p t;j = 0 ; 7 j,j 0 t U l t;j + p t;j w t;j z j 0; with equality i f l t;j 0; 8 ,p t;j + p t;j+1 1 + r t;j+1 = 0 ; 9 a t;J+1 = 0 ; 10 j = j 0 t; : : : ; J , where U c t;j and U l t;j denote the derivative o f U with respect to c t;j and l t;j respectively. 1 Using the consumers' optimality conditions, we can construct a sequence of implementability constraints which will allow us to de ne a Ramsey problem in which the government chooses allocations rather than after-tax prices. The time-t implementability constraint is obtained by multiplying the budget constraints 6 by p t;j , summing over 1 The Inada conditions guarantee that consumption and leisure will be strictly positive in each period. j 2 fj 0 t; : : : ; J g , and using 7 9 to substitute out prices. 2 The implementability constraint associated with the cohort born in period t is J X j=j 0 t j,j 0 t U c t;j c t;j + U l t;j l t;j = U c t;j 0 t 1 + r t;j 0 t a t;j 0 t : Proposition 2 shows that a feasible allocation can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium if and only if it satis es the implementability constraints 11. It should be emphasized that an age-dependent tax system is essential for this proposition to hold. In particular, for any given date, an allocation that satis es the implementability constraints does not necessarily have the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption constant across individuals of di erent ages. Consequently, an allocation can only be consistent with the consumers' rst order conditions if the after-tax interest rates are age-dependent. Similarly, the after-tax wage rate should also be age-dependent. It will be shown in Section 4 that further restrictions need to be imposed on the Ramsey problem for an allocation to be implementable with age-independent taxes. Let t t be the Lagrange multiplier associated with generation t's implementability constraint 11 The objective function W t includes the implementability constraint associated with the cohort born in period t. The shadow v alue of relaxing this constraint, in terms of period-t marginal utility of a newborn individual, is given by the costate variable t . Since government debt is unconstrained, the government budget constraint does not e ectively constrain the maximization problem and has therefore been omitted from the Ramsey problem. Once a solution is found, the government budget constraint can be used to back out the level of government debt.
Characterization of Optimal Fiscal Policies
Let t t denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the time-t feasibility constraint 3. The necessary conditions for a solution to the Ramsey problem are , t t 1 + n + t +1 t+1 1 , + f k t+1 = 0 15 t W c t;j , t+j t+j j = 0 16 t W l t;j + t+j t+j j z j f l t+j 0 with equality i f l t;j 0 17 for t = ,J; : : : , and j = j 0 t; : : : ; J , where W c t;j and W l t;j denote the derivative o f W with respect to c t;j and l t;j respectively.
We now derive necessary conditions under which the Ramsey allocation features zero taxation of labor and capital income. This is done by comparing the optimality conditions from the consumers' problem to those of the Ramsey problem. Although we provide an example in section 3.4 of a utility function under which H c t;j = H c t;j+1 , it is clear that neither this condition nor the equivalent condition for labor income taxes to be zero hold for general utility functions. This amounts to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 At each date the optimal tax rate on labor income is di erent from zero unless H l t;j = H c t;j and the optimal tax rate on capital income is di erent from zero unless H c t;j = H c t;j+1 . Proposition 3 shows that the government will in general use non-zero taxes on both capital and labor income. In contrast to in nitely-lived agent models, capital income taxes are non-zero even if the solution to the Ramsey problem converges to a steady state. Since consumption and leisure are, in general, not constant over the lifetime of an individual, there are no reasons to expect that H c t;j = H c t;j+1 for any t, not even in the steady state. On the contrary, the function H c t;j in in nitely-lived agent models becomes a constant in the steady state since these models abstract from life-cycle elements.
The steady state solution, if it exists, is characterized by the following equations:
1 , + f k = 1 + n ; . Notice that in steady state the marginal product of capital net of depreciation equals the e ective discount rate applied to di erent generations 1 + n= , 1 . This condition implies, as was originally shown by Samuelson 1968 , that the capital-labor ratio coincides with that of the rst best allocation, that is, it coincides with the capital-labor ratio that would be achieved if the government had access to lump-sum taxation. In other words, the steady state capital-labor ratio has the modi ed golden rule property.
The steady state allocation is also independent o f the transition path leading to it. In particular, for each v alue of we can solve for the nal steady state path independently of the transition that leads to this steady state. Associated with each v alue of , or nal steady state, there is an optimal amount of public debt which can be backed out of the government budget constraint. This amount of government debt is accumulated during the transition path from the initial to the nal steady state allocation. The higher is, the lower are the accumulated government debt and the welfare of generations alive during the transition. This property is not shared by in nitely-lived agent models, where the transition path determines the steady state allocation of the Ramsey problem. In particular, the steady state allocation depends on the exogenous bounds imposed on capital income taxes during the transition.
We can characterize further the optimal path of Ramsey taxes for two forms of utility functions. First we consider CES utility functions in which leisure enters multiplicatively. This class of preferences includes those that are necessary for an economy t o h a v e a balanced growth path. Second we study optimal taxation for CES utility functions for consumption with additively separable leisure. Both forms of utility functions have been widely used in the public nance literature. F rom 15, this will only be the case if = 1 + n. Finally, 22 implies that labor income taxes will also be age-independent. But for 21 to hold under age-independent taxes, z j = z, j = 0 ; : : : ; J , needs to be imposed.
CES Preferences
The converse follows immediately. This proposition highlights that with CES preferences, capital income taxes are zero in the long run only under very restrictive assumptions on parameters. For utility functions analyzed in the next subsection, zero taxation on capital income holds much more generally.
Additively Separable Preferences
Consider utility functions of the form Uc; 1 , l = u c + v l ; 31 where u is homogeneous of degree 1 , c and U; satis es the Inada conditions.
Our second Corollary to Proposition 3 shows that for this class of utility functions, capital income taxes will not be used during the transition nor in the long run.
Corollary 2 For utility function of the form given above 31, the Ramsey problem prescribes zero taxes on capital income from time period 1 and thereafter.
Proof. Again, this follows directly from Proposition 3. Under utility functions of the form 31, H c t;j = u 00 c t;j u 0 c t;j c t;j ;
which corresponds to the negative of the coe cient of relative risk aversion , c . It follows that H c t;j = H c for all t and j, and 25 implies that a t;j = 0 . 3 Under this class of utility functions, we show that the long run labor income tax prole over an individual's life depends directly on the income elasticity of labor supplied at di erent ages.
Proposition 4 Let the utility function be of the form given by 31 and suppose that the Ramsey allocations converge to a steady state. In that steady state, the relative tax rates on labor income at di erent ages are inversely related to the relative income elasticities of labor supplied at those ages.
Proof. Combining equations 16 at age j and 17 at age j + 1 for the non-trivial case of positive labor supply together with their counterparts from the consumers' problem 7 at age j, 8 at age j + 1 and 9, the tax rate on labor income at age j + 1 i s where j is the income elasticity of l j . It follows from 33 that the income from relatively inelastically supplied labor is to be taxed proportionally more than the income from relatively more elastically supplied labor. Proposition 4 can beviewed as an application to a life-cycle framework of the public nance principle that necessities should be taxed more than luxuries Stiglitz 1980 and Kehoe 1991 . In other words, labor income should betaxed relatively more heavily when it is relatively more income-inelastic. It can also beshown that the income elasticity of the labor supply depends on the labor productivity pro le and the discount rate of individuals relative to the intergenerational rate of time preferences which determines the steady state interest rate. To see this, notice that when = 1 + n and z j = z for all j, the steady state consumption and labor supply are constant throughout individuals' lives. It then follows from 32 that labor taxes are age-independent. In other words, these restrictions imply that the income elasticity of the labor supply is constant across ages. Any deviation from these restrictions will change the relative income elasticity of labor supplied at di erent ages and age-dependent taxes will be used.
Age-Independent Taxes
In this section we study Ramsey taxation when taxes on labor and capital income are not allowed to depend on the age of the individual supplying the factor of production. We begin by c haracterizing the set of implementable allocations under an age-independent tax system. Next, we show that if the solution to the Ramsey problem converges to a steady state allocation, then the steady state allocation satis es two properties that were shown to hold under an age-dependent tax system. Finally, w e show that the necessary conditions for zero taxation of capital income in the steady state of an age-independent tax system are much more stringent than under an age-dependent tax system.
We show that the set of allocations that the government can implement with ageindependent taxes is a proper subset of the set of implementable allocations under an age-dependent tax system. Intuitively, with age-independent taxes the government has very few instruments to make a given allocation satisfy the consumer's rst order conditions. Thus, at each point in time an allocation has to satisfy two extra conditions in order to be implementable with an age-independent tax system. First, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure needs to be constant across individuals of di erent ages. Second, the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption also needs to be constant across individuals of di erent ages. The above necessary conditions for age-independent taxes can beexpressed in the following compact way In Appendix A we show that if the solution to the Ramsey problem converges to a steady state, then the steady state allocation satis es the following two properties: rst, the steady state capital-labor ratio has the modi ed golden rule property, that is, the steady state marginal product of capital net of depreciation is equal to the e ective discount rate applied to di erent generations 1 + n= , 1. Second, the steady state allocation is independent of the transition path leading to it.
The rst order conditions of the Ramsey problem also imply that the conditions for zero capital income taxation are much more stringent with age-independent taxes. In fact, when the utility function is of the form 31 additively separable in consumption and leisure capital income taxes are zero in the steady state only if = 1 + n and z j = z for all j.
Furthermore, in contrast to an optimal age-dependent tax system, capital income taxes will be di erent from zero throughout the transition path to the nal steady state allocation.
This result illustrates how the optimal tax rates crucially depend on the set of scal instruments available to the government. When either 6 = 1 + n or z j 6 = z for some j, the income elasticity of labor supply is not constant across ages. In this case the government would like to tax labor income at di erent rates over the lifetime of an individual. When labor income taxes are not allowed to depend on age, the government can a ect the way individuals substitute labor intertemporally by resorting to non-zero capital income taxes and use this margin to tax labor income more heavily at ages where it is relatively income inelastic.
Numerical Examples
In this section we present some numerical examples in order to gain further insights about the properties of Ramsey taxation. The model economy is parameterized so that its initial steady state mimics important features of the U.S. economy for some initial tax rates on capital and labor income. At date zero taxes are set optimally and we compute the associated steady state Ramsey equilibria under both age-dependent and age-independent tax systems. 4 The utility function used in these examples is additive separable in consumption and leisure
The production function is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas form, with the capital share represented by . The parameter values assumed for this exercise are shown in Table 1 , and we use Hansen's pro le as the labor productivity pro le. 4 In our experiments we use the fact that the nal steady state is independent o f the transition path. Notice that computing the steady state path involves solving a highly non-linear system of equations. We selected = :966 as our benchmark discount factor. For this value of , the steady state allocations of the initial equilibrium and the age-dependent Ramsey equilibrium share the same consumption growth rate along individuals' life. The other two v alues for were chosen slightly below = : 96 and slightly above = : 970 the benchmark level. Surprisingly, Table 2 shows that, given a value of , the utility achieved by a newborn individual and the economy's aggregate variables do not vary signi cantly across the steady states of the age-dependent and the age-independent Ramsey equilibria. Indeed, the maximum di erence in steady state output between the two t ypes of equilibria , across the three values of reported in Table 2 , does not exceed .6 percent. Similarly, for all values of reported, the di erences in utility for newborn agents do not represent more than .01 percent o f consumption of the initial steady state Ccomp. Notice, however, that tax rates do vary across the two tax systems. When taxes are age-dependent, capital income taxes are zero see Corollary 2 and labor income taxes vary signi cantly along the life of individuals see Figure 1 . These tax rates tend to follow, with a lag, the shape of the age-pro le of labor productivity. Proposition 4 is useful in understanding this nding. This Proposition shows that it is optimal to tax labor income at relatively high rates at ages where it is relatively income inelastic. It is easy to show that, ceteris paribus, the income elasticity of labor supplied at age j is inversely related to the age-j labor e ciency level.
Since the after-tax interest rates in all the equilibria computed are higher than individuals' rate of time preference, it is also the case that, ceteris paribus, labor is more income inelastic the lower the age of an individual. Contrary to the age-dependent Ramsey equilibrium, the tax rates on capital income are positive|albeit small, 2 to 3 percent|when taxes are not allowed to depend on age see section 4. In addition, it is interesting to note that the di erence between the average tax rate on labor income with age-dependent taxes and the tax rate with age-independent taxes does not exceed .5 percent for any of the three values of reported.
The sensitivity of the Ramsey equilibrium to the value of the intergenerational discount factor is striking. Table 2 shows that with = :96 a newborn individual living in the initial steady state can forego about 2 percent of his lifetime consumption and yet achieve the steady state utility level of the Ramsey equilibrium. When = :97, newborn individuals will only be indi erent b e t w een the two allocations if their consumption of goods in the initial steady state is supplemented by about 7 percent. The enormous impact of on steady state utility is easily understood when we observe the negative association between the steady state government debt and the intergenerational discount factor. When = :97 the government owns more than 30 percent of the capital stock. This implies that generations alive when the economy reaches the steady state face lower tax rates on their income. This comes at the expense, of course, of the individuals alive during the transition to the Ramsey steady state. These generations are the ones nancing the purchases of capital by the government.
Conclusion
This paper studies optimal taxation in an overlapping generations economy. It characterizes the optimal path of scal policy, both in the long run and in the transition to the steady state. The implications of this study in terms of capital income taxation are in sharp contrast with the Chamley-Judd results. In particular, it is shown that the optimal rate of capital income taxation will in general be di erent from zero, even in the long run.
An important drawback in our study, which permeates most of the literature on optimal taxation, is that the scal policies we consider are not time consistent Kydland and Prescott 1977 . Although this problem is not as acute in overlapping generations economies as is it in in nitely-lived agent models, a more satisfactory characterization of optimal taxation would focus on time consistent policies.
An interesting avenue for future research is to introduce human capital accumulation in our environment. We conjecture that the main properties of optimal taxation derived in this paper would remain unaltered by the presence of human capital accumulation.
A Age-Independent Taxes Under age-independent taxes, the Ramsey problem is given by:
where W t is de ned in 14, subject to feasibility 3, and the implementability constraints 
